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Abstract 
This paper explores a polemic between André Breton and Georges Bataille around the question of the 
politics of the avant-garde. Focussing on texts composed in the late 1920s, principally Breton’s Second 
Manifesto of Surrealism and Bataille’s ‘The “Old Mole” and the Prefix Sur in the Words Surhomme and 
Surrealist’, this paper argues that in examining this debate around matter and material, it is possible 
to extract two distinct conceptions of the places of subjectivity and revolution in avant-garde 
aesthetics. While Breton wishes to separately define the idealist aesthetic projects of Surrealism and 
the materialist project for revolution, Bataille argues that a commitment to that materialist project 
requires a similarly materialist aesthetics.  
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A Disputed Memory 
In his 1964 introduction to Maurice Nadeau’s semi-official History of Surrealism, 
Roger Shattuck tells a story that bookends the decade of Surrealism’s most fervent 
creativity, and reveals something essential about its evolution.1 Shattuck describes how 
Around 1920 … they gathered frequently in a café called the Certá near the 
Opéra. Towards the end of one meeting they discovered that the waiter had left 
his wallet … on a bench close by … [T]hey filched the wallet, carried it off to 
another café, and argued violently over whether they could practise their 
liberated morality at the expense of a poor hardworking waiter … Paul Éluard 
was appointed to keep the wallet until a final decision could be reached the 
following day. On his own initiative Éluard returned it anonymously to the 
waiter. At the next meeting everyone attacked him bitterly for having acted 
without a collective decision and turned his back on the new morality. At least 
so Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes tells it. But the first appearance of his version 
… provoked four excoriating replies: from Louis Aragon (who signed 
‘salutations communistes’), Giuseppe Ungaretti (who added the expletive 
‘fascist’ after his signature), Tzara (who rejected the entire article as a 
distortion), and Éluard. He maintained that the facts were entirely different: he 
had originally stolen the wallet from a priest, brought his booty to the Certá so 
that the group could consider his action, and following the discussion presented 
                                                        
1 I thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. 
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the priest’s wallet to the waiter as a deserving beneficiary. Shattuck 1978, pp. 15-
16) 
This decade was decisive not only for Surrealism, but for the historical avant-garde as 
a whole, and this story encapsulates some of the reasons why that might be. One might 
perhaps start with the Ribemont-Dessaignes description of the theft. Whatever the 
truth of that description, it seems certain that in its pointless provocation and 
subsequent facile debate, this presentation of the facts is influenced by André Breton’s 
far more famous provocation in the Second Manifesto of Surrealism, published a year 
before this story was recounted, where he asserts that 
The simplest Surrealist act consists of dashing down into the street, pistol in 
hand, and firing blindly, as fast as you can pull the trigger, into the crowd. 
Anyone who, at least once in his life, has not dreamed of thus putting an end to 
the petty system of debasement and cretinization in effect has a well-defined 
place in that crowd, with his belly at barrel level. (Breton 1972, p. 125) 
Both the debate on the theft of the wallet, and Breton’s ukase, along with Aragon’s 
comradely greeting, are artefacts of a Surrealism now struggling to align itself with the 
dictates, laid down in 1928, of the Comintern’s ‘Third Period’. These dictates, produced 
in the aftermath of Stalin achieving definitive supremacy over the Party in Russia, 
stipulated that, given the imminence of a worldwide revolutionary upsurge, a position 
of uncomprising rigour was to be established in all communist parties, and any 
collaboration with reformists – now relabelled ‘social fascists’ – was to be violently 
rejected. More broadly, though, they are indicative of a Surrealist avant-garde 
struggling to resolve inherent contradictions . 
Those contradictions, too, can be witnessed not only in the opposing radicalisations of 
Aragon and Ungaretti, but also in Éluard’s different retelling. Here the Surrealists are 
reconfigured not as libertines of the imaginary, but as anticlerical Robin Hoods, 
experimenting with direct action and communist redistribution.  
This marks a shift from an ethic of aristocratic detachment – Breton (1972, p. 47) ends 
the first manifesto with ‘Existence is elsewhere’ – to one of the engagé handmaiden 
and embroiderer of a larger revolutionary culture, and is of course partly determined 
by the external events alluded to above.  
The shift Breton undergoes in these years – and the tensions that shift endeavours to 
resolve – can be vividly witnessed in the debate between Breton and Georges Bataille 
about the precise relationship between political commitment and revolutionary 
aesthetics.  
In exploring this contretemps, I will argue that the debate represents – and this is why 
Surrealism remains central to conceptualising the trajectory of the avant-garde in the 
20th century – a deepening (and unique) engagement with the foundational premises 
that united the historic avant-gardes; above all, that an aesthetic revolution must be 





The Foundations of the Avant-Garde 
To reconstruct this debate, it is useful firstly to sketch the rough outline of a heuristic 
model that allows us to grasp something of the specificity of the avant-garde and thus 
to see the lineaments of its historical trajectory in these years.  
Firstly, there is an overarching concern with politics. What this means for the avant-
garde in practice is an aesthetics overdetermined by a revolutionary conjuncture and 
consequent revolutionary commitment. In the case of Breton and a number of other 
Surrealists, this would take the form of joining Le Parti communiste français (PCF) in 
1927, preceding the debates discussed in this essay. That revolutionary commitment 
is, more precisely, to a revolutionary programme, which was constituted by the 
allegiance to a type of universal subjectivity that embodies the social order to be 
instituted by the revolution. It is the movement – from revolution, to militant 
(universal) subject, to community – that grasps the specificity of the avant-garde, and 
allows us to isolate it from modernism more broadly, which might share some of the 
same political commitments (in some exponents) or aesthetic radicalism (in others) 
but which does not unite its aesthetics under these three priorities.  
Additionally, these three structuring principles – revolution, subjectivity and 
community – allow us to grasp the central axes around which avant-garde aesthetic 
practice revolved. For what constituted a particular grouping as part of the avant-garde 
was their commitment to the unity of these three principles. That is, what finally 
constitutes an avant-garde is theory itself.  
On one level, this is banal or unsurprising. In popular consciousness, the avant-garde 
formation precedes the individual artist. Futurism is more widely recognisable than 
Marinetti, Surrealism than Breton, Dada than Tzara and so on. This recognition of the 
self-described ‘movement’ over the individual artist indicates what might be seen as 
the theoretical priority of the movement; their founding moments are, almost 
universally, manifestos, or manifesto-like interventions.  
But the priority of theoretical construction and unity over the individual production of 
aesthetic work lies not merely in this will to group uniformity. It is more significant 
than that. For these three axes of investigation can be said to constitute an answer to a 
question that is central to politics under capitalism: what does revolution look like? 
More broadly and schematically, we might describe this as the question of how vast, 
communal, self-conscious social change can be both represented and, necessarily 
following this, enacted.  
Thus the three structuring principles elucidated above can be said to constitute a kind 
of general answer under which the avant-garde operates: this change occurs through 
revolution, which is brought about by self-conscious, militant subjects, who, in turn, 
both constitute and establish a new form of social organisation and community.  
The avant-garde, then, is a theoretical and aesthetic formation that articulates a 
particular answer in advance of the answer’s (necessarily ‘universal’) historical 
appearance.  
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The Eagle, the Mole, and the Prefix ‘Sur’ 
How then does this appear for Breton? In the Manifesto of Surrealism, Breton (1972, 
p. 14) tells the story, ‘according to which Saint-Pol-Roux, in times gone by, used to have 
a notice posted on the door of his manor house in Camaret, every evening before he 
went to sleep, which read: THE POET IS WORKING’. This, for Breton (1972, p. 14), 
was of course merely the jocular confirmation of the central thesis of the manifesto – 
he desires an avant-garde that would work towards ‘the future resolution of these two 
states, dream and reality, which are seemingly so contradictory, into a kind of absolute 
reality, a surreality’. In relating this story, though, Breton reveals something of 
Surrealism’s complicity in the affirmation of a programme that he broadly shares with 
Marinetti. Surrealism is both a concerted movement, but also an ‘invisible ray’, a 
detached, untrammelled, desirous unconsciousness, which Breton (1972, p. 47) detects 
in the art and works of the past: ‘This world is only relatively in tune with thought, and 
incidents of this kind are only the most obvious episodes of a war in which I am proud 
to be participating’.2 At the outset of Surrealism, then, is the assertion of a proud 
minority assured in its knowledge of its own future generalisation – an insurgent 
subjectivity, and with a clear understanding of the material through which the 
revolution will occur – the universal dream-life of ‘mankind’. Breton’s (1972, p. 26) 
basic tenet is what he will describe as the belief in ‘the superior reality of certain forms 
of previously neglected association, in the omnipotence of dream, in the disinterested 
play of thought. It tends to ruin once and for all all other psychic mechanisms and to 
substitute itself for them in solving all the principle problems of life’.3 The blurring of 
different perceived ways of accessing the unconsciousness is authorised here by the 
universality, the a priori ‘omnipotence’ of the dream. This is the centrality of the story 
Breton has narrated – the Surrealist revolution will be for a workers’ world, just as 
other revolutionary programmes of the time promised. With the self-management 
(‘the disinterested play of thought’) of our dream-work, ‘all the principle problems of 
life’ will see resolution (Breton 1972, p. 26). 
Breton’s materialism is a materialism of ideas and ideation, and it is one that would 
become clearer as the politics of Surrealism, somewhat muted in the initial manifesto, 
or at any rate residual, were enunciated more fully in the Second Manifesto of 
Surrealism. Here, in 1929, we can see what is in retrospect the tombstone of the 
historic avant-garde, at once a confirmation of the inextricably linked projects of the 
revolution and the avant-garde, and their practical severance.  
In this text Breton also attacks Georges Bataille over precisely the issue of materialism 
(Bataille (cited in Richardson 1994, p. 4) himself had already, and in only slightly more 
blunt terms, detected this as a point of difference, dissociating himself from the 
movement on the grounds that it contained ‘too many fucking idealists’). In taking up 
this attack on Bataille, Breton was prolonging a polemic that had begun with Bataille’s 
parting of ways and was continued in a 1929 debate about the significance of Salvador 
Dali’s work.4 Breton (1972, p. 185) noted that ‘when the “unmentionable brush” Jarry 
spoke of fell into his plate, Bataille declared he was enchanted’ before commenting, ‘In 
his Différence de la Philosophie de la nature chez Démocrite et chez Epicure, Marx 
tells us how, in every age, there thus come into being hair-philosophers, fingernail-
                                                        
2 Note the continued reliance on martial metaphors, an unsurprising and nigh-universal trope of the avant-garde. 
3 Emphasis added. 





philosophers, toenail-philosophers, excrement-philosophers, etc.’ 5  Essentially, for 
Breton, Bataille’s work – of which there was at this point little6 – was guilty of a literally 
obscene vulgarity: his materialism was shit. Breton (1972, p. 156-60), in this manifesto, 
would instead definitively assert a cleavage between the commitment to a Marxist 
politics and the omnipotent dream-workers: ‘To be sure, Surrealism, which as we have 
seen deliberately opted for the Marxist doctrine in the realm of social problems, has no 
intention of minimizing Freudian doctrine as it applies to the evaluation of idea: on the 
contrary, Surrealism believes Freudian criticism to be the first and only one with a 
really solid basis’. It is this formal split – between an aesthetic project of inwardness 
and a politics of public concern with ‘social problems’ – that Bataille’s work challenged, 
grounded as it was not in unmediated ideation, axiomatically detached from sociality, 
but instead in a ‘base’ materialism, the materials of which emerge from what might 
best be described as the abject.7 
What Breton does here is formalise an implicit contradiction in the historic avant-
garde, and affirm an aesthetics of separation that resolves the contradiction by setting 
up the dichotomy aesthetics/politics and then asserting the compatibility of this 
duality. In a sense, this engenders an aesthetic not dissimilar to those previous 
ideologies of autonomy that Peter Bürger (1984) identified as the wellspring of the 
avant-garde; the autonomy here, however, is predicated tenuously on the ideas of two 
supposedly compatible theories of ‘revolution’ – Marxism as Breton conceived it, and 
psychoanalysis. The revolutionary claims of the avant-garde – their programmatic 
totalisation – were to be dissolved back to the separation against which they were 
originally set. In the context of Stalin’s political eminence, and the concomitant 
hegemony of what would come to be called ‘socialist realism’, this return to separation 
was an understandable retreat, given Breton’s commitments.8 Denis Hollier (1992, p. 
108) has suggested that the differing approaches of Breton and Bataille to the question 
of psychoanalysis can be traced in part to their biographical encounters with it, Bataille 
initially as a patient, Breton a doctor with a professional interest and a (small) personal 
relationship with its founder. This might be seen in their relation to Marxism, too. At 
this point Breton was already associated with Leon Trotsky, now exiled, and, perhaps, 
for those somewhat to the left of the Third International, the most prominent and 
credible representative of the programmatic workers movement remaining (and with 
whom, alongside Diego Rivera, Breton would compose in 1938 Manifesto: Towards a 
Free Revolutionary Art9). Bataille wanted little to do with this. It may be this different 
trajectory that explains in part the particular critique of Breton and Surrealism that 
Bataille develops – or, more accurately, that I believe can be located within his roughly 
contemporaneous work – and why, finally, Bataille chooses not to endorse the 
separation reconstructed by Breton, but to instead return to the contradiction or 
aporia of the historical avant-garde and attempt to trace its limits, and suggest other 
possible paths of exit. Thus, Bataille’s theoretical work of the late 1920s, in the wake of 
historic aesthetic and political defeats, can be read not merely as a local response to 
                                                        
5 See also Hollier 1992, p. 105. 
6 That is, little work that was published under his own name and unrelated to his strictly academic concerns in 
numismatics. As the editor of the journal Documents, begun the year Breton published the Second Manifesto, 
Bataille was influential in other ways, of course. See Ades & Baker 2006. 
7 My usage here should not be confused with the once-fashionable deployment of the term as conceptual 
decoration for soi disant ‘shocking’ art. For a brief discussion of that fate, see Noys 2000, p. 33–35. 
8 For the argument that ‘socialist realism’ represented a continuation of the avant-garde project, see Groys 1992. 
9 See Breton, Rivera & Trotsky 2011. 
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Surrealism’s new formulation, but as an attempt to go beyond the contradictions now 
visible in the programmatism of the historic avant-garde. 
Although it was unpublished at the time, Bataille’s only extensive essay from this 
period that explicitly addresses Surrealism, ‘The “Old Mole” and the Prefix Sur in the 
Words Surhomme and Surrealism’, makes clear, if in a polemical and largely negative 
fashion (although this negativity was, as we will see, central to Bataille’s wider 
response), the essential points of difference Bataille discerns between himself and the 
Surrealism formulated in the Second Manifesto. He acknowledges the importance this 
work has for surrealism, calling the latest manifesto ‘without any doubt the most 
consequential work, the most consistent declaration that the surrealists have 
attempted for a long time’ and this importance is understood as a function of what 
Bataille believes this text reveals of the Surrealist project (Bataille 1985b, p. 40).10 In 
that text he quotes the final lines of the Second Manifesto (observing, also, that 
‘nothing can enter M. Breton’s confused head except in poetic form’) (Bataille 1985b, 
p. 41): ‘Let him, in spite of any reservations, use the avenging arm of the idea against 
the bestiality of all beings and of all things, and let him one day, vanquished – but 
vanquished only if the world is the world – welcome the discharge of his sad rifles like 
a salvo fired in salute’ (Breton 1972, p. 187).11 Here, at the close of his manifesto, Breton 
attempts to resolve, or at least force a reconciliation between the previous duality he 
had set up. We should pause over this passage, as Bataille does, because the way in 
which Breton stages this reconciliation (the hieratic tone is appropriate) is highly 
interesting. Here, Breton is calling for a militant allegiance to the ‘avenging arm of the 
idea’ against materiality itself, an apparently doomed assault that, in spite of whatever 
allegiances (‘reservations’) one might have to the world as it is, must be conducted 
nonetheless, for that world as it is amounts to sheer, base animality, and will, to the 
extent that it remains this world, be victorious. There is space here to see Breton’s 
argument not as a lament but as a warning, that the seemingly inevitable defeat is 
merely apparent, that the world need not remain the same. But the tone of premature 
obsequy remains difficult to shake. The vanquished surrealist needs to resign ‘himself’ 
to the beauty of a sad, a graveside salute. For Breton, the aporia of an unredeemed and 
unredeemable world and the art that would accompany it can only be resolved by a 
redoubled commitment to the partiality of the surrealist idea even though he 
acknowledges that this will ultimately be insufficient, even on its own terms. The 
distance from the programme of the historic avant-garde is clear.  
Bataille’s response to this reformulation takes as its starting point Marx’s notion of 
social revolution as the ‘old mole’, developed in his reflections on the aftershocks of the 
1848 revolutions, specifically, in the restoration of the French empire under the 
eponymous Napoleon III, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Marx (2010, 
p. 237) writes that ‘the revolution is thorough. It is still on its journey through 
purgatory. It goes about its business methodically . . . when it has completed this, the 
second half of its preliminary work, Europe will leap from its seat and exultantly 
exclaim: “Well worked, old mole!”’12 The metaphor is an attempt to grasp what might 
be called ‘cycles of struggle’, whereby waves of revolution seem to punctuate periods 
marked by stasis and retrenchment; the nature of the coming social revolution is such 
that any defeat or setback merely means a return to the underground (at the time, of 
                                                        
10 Of course, it is in the interests of Bataille’s polemic to emphasise the importance and centrality of a text he 
would go on to attack. 
11 Italics in original. 





course, this would be figuratively true for many activists), during which the vast 
geological, biological, and animal processes of recomposition continue their work, and 
the mole will emerge above ground once again to the exultation of Europe. For Bataille, 
the metaphor is more significant, as it represents for him an allegiance not merely to 
the longue durée of social revolution, but to the very materiality, the baseness, the 
‘low’-ness of the mole’s progress. To this figure Bataille (1985b, p. 34) counterposes the 
‘more virile conception’ of the eagle, resident in the heights ‘with uncontested 
glamour’. If the old mole is the totem of a revolutionary proletariat, then the eagle is 
the ensign of ‘the unconstrained development of individual authoritarian power’. But, 
Bataille (1985b, p. 34) suggests, ‘[r]evolutionary idealism tends to make of the 
revolution an eagle above eagles, a supereagle [suraigle] striking down authoritarian 
imperialism, an idea as radiant as an adolescent seizing power for the benefit of 
utopian enlightenment’. Thus the second portion of Bataille’s title becomes clear. 
Revolutionary idealism is what links this figure of the ‘supereagle’, surrealism itself, 
and the Nietzschean overman. Juxtaposed to this trinity of height, then, is the ‘old 
mole’, the revolution that ‘hollows out chambers in a decomposed soil repugnant to the 
delicate nose of utopians’: ‘Marx’s point of departure has nothing to do with the 
heavens, preferred station of the imperialist eagle as of Christian or revolutionary 
utopians. He begins in the bowels of the earth, as in the materialist bowels of 
proletarians’ (Bataille 1985b, p. 35). Bataille’s critique, ostensibly developed through 
an exploration of the Nietzschean idealism he detects in Surrealism, is thus broadened 
to become a more general critique of revolutionary idealism – programmatism, we 
might say – equally discernable in the reactionary rebellion of Marinetti.  
For Bataille, Nietzsche embodies the contradictions inherent in what might be called 
the aristocratic critique of bourgeois value. That critique is built upon a profound 
distaste for the ‘senile idealism’ of the established order, and a ‘passionate revolt’ 
against ‘the hypocrisy and moral shabbiness that presides over current world 
exploitation’ (Bataille 1985b, p. 36).13 This is – in what is a very early engagement with 
a thinker who would continue to preoccupy Bataille and who even here deeply informs 
his notion of revolution – the hard kernel of materialism upon which the idealist 
edifices of the supereagles will be constructed. But, even here, in his originary revolt, 
Nietzsche reveals the tendency that would later come to vitiate his notion of revolution, 
for the focus of this critique – and what makes it finally an idealist critique of idealism 
– is that it is founded on disgust not at the conditions that generate the endlessly 
proliferating nihilism that passes for ethical justification in this world, but at the 
justification itself. This resulted finally, from Nietzsche’s class position; he had nothing 
‘whatsoever in common with the working proletariat’, which meant that even if his 
diagnosis of decline was accurate, and even if his prescription of a transvaluation of all 
values was a useful depiction of revolution, what was needed was precisely a 
renunciation of all ‘moral values associated with class superiority’, a renunciation only 
possible through the dark vitality of the proletariat (Bataille 1985b, p. 37). Nietzsche 
was thus ‘condemned by circumstance to imagine his break with conformist ideology 
as an Icarian adventure’ (Bataille 1985b, p. 37). This, for a man of Nietzsche’s class, 
was all that would be possible. Bataille (1985b, p. 37) asks, in explaining his Icarus 
metaphor, ‘what can there be in the will to rise above social conditions, if one excludes 
the unconscious pathological desire to be struck down violently like Icarus’? It is in this 
curious metaphor that one can find Bataille’s sympathy for both the Surrealists and 
                                                        
13 Bataille’s opinion of Nietzsche – although still critically sympathetic here – would develop into a far closer, if 
still conflicted, engagement. See, firstly, Bataille 1985a; and, of course, Bataille 1994. 
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Nietzsche. For if they represented the Icarian desire for absolutely undetermined 
overcoming, what constitutes the sun at its zenith? In short, as we have seen, the sun 
is the totality of social conditions that one cannot hope to outfly with jerry-built ideas 
of transcendence; one will find oneself, inevitably, drowned in the icy waters of 
rationalising capital. 14 Indeed, Nietzsche is a useful case study because, unlike the 
French romantics or Wagner, he had no time for ‘sentimental foolishness’ and 
‘medieval awkwardness’ and was intimately aware of the dangers of a kind of objectless 
transvaluation, spurious rejection and archaic pedantry, and so was forced to finally 
make claims only for a ‘morality of the master’ (Bataille 1985b, p. 38). But, Bataille 
(1985b, p. 38) immediately suggests, ‘[i]t is not the masters who need such a morality: 
exploiters are not going to seek their values in unbalanced philosophy. When their 
values are given to them immediately by the economic conditions of exploitation, 
American bankers dispense with The Will to Power’. Here, the very struggle to avoid 
the backward-looking reaction of Wagnerian romanticism paradoxically results in a 
revival of precisely those archaic values whose use to the masters of this mode of 
production are not even of the ornamental kind. Although Bataille does not address 
this, Nietzsche’s concepts, stripped of their paradoxical circling around renunciation 
and affirmation, and retooled with the vulgarity of social Darwinism would indeed re-
emerge as ideologies, as we have seen. But Marinetti’s proto-fascist Nietzsche is a 
product of the same broad period of crisis as Bataille’s, and the critique here of 
Nietzsche is all the more applicable to his epigones. 
Surrealism falls into the same trap as Nietzsche – the clue is the prefix sur, as it denotes 
for both Nietzsche and Surrealism not merely a metaphysical overcoming, but a 
topological one: it is ‘higher’. What distinguishes Surrealism, and what makes its 
project both more conflicted and finally more objectionable is that as it ‘is immediately 
distinguishable by the addition of low values (the unconscious, sexuality, filthy 
language, etc.), it invests these values with an elevated character by associating them 
with the most immaterial values’ (Bataille 1985b, p. 39). 
What Bataille sets in opposition to the tragic, ‘Icarian’ visions of Nietzsche and the 
Surrealists is, firstly, a political objection. That is, to the extent that Surrealism and 
Nietzscheanism either defer violent revolutionary politics for a time to come, or else 
insist on that revolution’s fundamental interiority, as a purely personal overcoming of 
the bestiality of the world, Bataille discerns that they reject all that is abject, or base. 
The abject, the part of the totality disavowed, violently rejected, and yet for those very 
reasons constitutive of the world as world, is that which all idealism must deny, but, 
in so denying, it must in turn destroy any revolutionary politics that idealism arrogates 
to itself: the abject is the place at which an avant-garde must situate itself to be avant-
garde at all. In the extraordinary final paragraphs of his essay, Bataille (1985b, p. 43) 
responds directly to Breton’s previously quoted peroration: 
The earth is base, the world is world, human agitation is only vulgar and 
perhaps not acknowledgeable: this is the shame of Icarian despair. But to the 
loss of the head there is no other reply: a crass sneer, vile grimaces. For it is 
human agitation, with all the vulgarity of needs small and great, with its flagrant 
disgust for the police who repress it, it is the agitation of all men (except for the 
police and the friends of the police), that alone determines revolutionary mental 
forms, in opposition to bourgeois mental forms. In human terms no baseness 
                                                        





values, at present, the rage of refined literati, lovers of an accursed poetry; what 
cannot move the heart of a ditchdigger already has the existence of shadows. 
There remains, it is true, the almost artificial lighting, which serves to display 
the ruins. And down with the denigrators of an immediate “human interest,” 
down with all the scribblers with their spiritual elevation and their sanctified 
disgust for material needs! 
For those bourgeois who still exercise a certain mastery of their intellectual 
domain, there is no possibility of instituting a culture, or even, more generally, 
purely proletarian principles of mental action … By excavating the fetid ditch of 
bourgeois culture, perhaps we will see open up in the depths of the earth 
immense and even sinister caves where force and human liberty will establish 
themselves, sheltered from the call to order of a heaven that today demands the 
most imbecilic elevation of any man’s spirit.15 
This passage marks both Bataille’s affirmation of the centrality of revolutionary politics 
to all thought and art, but also a definitive break with any sense of the programmatic 
overcoming that marked the historical avant-gardes that had just passed. The 
programmatic content of the historical avant-garde was predicated on, yes, the 
centrality of a revolutionary programme to production of art, but, more, as we have 
seen with the programmes of Zurich Dada and early Futurism, not to mention 
Surrealism, it was predicated too on the vision of a world remade in the image of man, 
art and life reconciled in a new reign of ideation and self-management.  
Bataille, in this passage, moves beyond this vision to something more general: if the 
historical avant-gardes yearned for that Hegelian ‘determinant negation’, Bataille 
(1997, p. 296) would opt for what he would later describe, in ‘Letter to X’ (the addressee 
being Alexandre Kojève, whose lectures on Hegel Bataille attended), as ‘unemployed 
negativity’. Subjectivity, as the labour of the negative, was fired. Revolutionary 
subjectivity would have to be something else entirely. 
What that was to be, precisely, remained at the centre of Bataille’s work throughout 
the 1930s, even as he and Breton managed a fleeting reconciliation in the face of a 
rising fascism, founding together the short-lived Contre-Attaque in 1935. Above all, it 
would lead Bataille to found the College of Sociology, which could be seen as at once a 
recapitulation and critique of the models of preceding avant-gardes, including 
Surrealism. If the avant-gardes are always at some level theoreticians of revolution, 
even in their moments of aesthetic production, so with their passing in the darkness of 
mid-century Europe, the ground of those theories must – for those who hold to the 
alchemy of revolution, who would remain ‘sorcerer’s apprentices’16 – become objects 
of theoretical investigation. And as another participant in the college, Roger Caillois 
(1988, p. 11), argued, such an investigation of the immanent sociality of the 
reproduction of community cannot be conducted without the conductors themselves 
posing again the question of revolutionary subjectivity, and – hopefully – becoming its 
new embodiment. The question of the avant-garde is no longer how one might aid the 
revolution; instead, it is the question of revolution itself. 
                                                        
15 Italics in original. 
16 See Bataille 1988. 
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